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Chapter 4 
Prospects for black representation 
· after Miller v Johnson 
Keith Reeves 
"Sadly ... one wonders whether the majority [of the Supreme Court 
justices} still believes that ... race discrimination against nonwhites is 
a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was." 
-Justice Harry Blackmun 1 
J.:. he 1990s undoubtedly will go down in.the history b.ooks _as.Jue , 
~)ec~d~ in ~hidi the poiitical pendulum veered toward a prevailing 
_disdain_for race.-conscious public policies. Perhaps nowhere has the 
swing of this pendulum been more controversial and disconcerting than 
in the arena of legislative districting. Io .the years.since_the pc1,ssage._Qf_tb,e 
1?82_amendments to the Voting Rights Act, we have witnessed an.avalanche 
of polarizing litigation around the explosive subject.of voting_districts_tJ:iat 1 
/ 
have _been intentionally configured by ,race. 
···· Following the directive of the 1982 amendments-~}:i!ch_i:g;i._ndare.ci 
racial reapportionment to take place afte.r .the J.99.0.Census-it was the 
~ -· . . . . , . . ·- " ' - ' 
view of U.S._Ju.st:ice_Department .officials that where_ra.cial_b,l~c-V:Q!.WE 
~;,hites is present, the c~eation.of majority-bla,ck_electi,-on_cii.s.tri.~ts 
p~~v~nt~ the dilution of blacks' voting strength and at the same time facili-
tates greater black representation. 2. By. ca~ing ~ut j~is,dicti;;;~i~-~hi~h 
tii,acks. comprise a majority of voters,.. then_the ___ districts_it:1-the_main_ip.-_ 
creased the HkeH}:iood that a black candidate. woukLbe..elected. 3,. 
~~ "'But the policy met with vehement resistance and out-and-out 
condemnation among conservatives in academic, judicial, political, and 
policy circles. Critics argued that the Voting Rights Act was being shaped 
"into an instrument for affirmative action in the electoral sphere." 4 
Configuring voting districts to increase the likelihood that blacks might be 
elected to Congress "raises the specter of racial quotas, deepening racial 
and ethnic cleavages, and minority political ghettos." 5 
On the contracy, retorted voting rights advocates. The 1982 amendments 
to the Voting Rights Act have not fully addressed the lack of equal political 
opportunity for blacks. For instance, the fact that blacks remain significantly 
underrepresented in elected office-especially at the federal level-is a 
troubling, if not shameful imperfection in the democratic functioning of 
this countcy. Equally problematic is that bloc voting among whites on 
account of racial animus still remains a considerable barrier for black political 
candidates competing in majority-white electoral settings. 6 Until recently, 
these facts constituted a compelling justification for racial districting to 
offset voting discrimination against black office-seekers. 7 
This was the case until the 1995 Su reme Court ruling that invalidated 
the use of race as "the redominant facto " · · ative boundary 
.!!!£§,_ Writing for a conservative plurality of the Court, Justice Anthony 
Kennedy reasoned: Q_ust as the state may not, absent extraordinary 
justification, segregate citizens on the basis of race in its public parks, 
buses, golf courses, beaches, and schools, the Government also may not 
separate its citizens into different voting districts on the basis of race.~So 
with the swipe of a judicial pen, Rep. Cynthia McKinney of Georgia-the 
state's first black congresswoman-saw her district change from two-thirds 
majority-black to two-thirds majority-white. lO McKinney and other black 
lawmakers were acutely aware of the dire implications of the new political 
reality. Indeed, a year later, Steven Holmes of 1be New York Times expressed 
that reality in a sentence shortly after the Court rendered decisions 
concerning majority-black districts in North Carolina and Texas: "The countcy 
will· soon have to face a practical question that all those legislative 
contortions were intended to avoid: Will whites vote for black candidates?" 11 
To say that this is a practical and empirical question of great dispute 
is an understatement. Taking that question's full measure requires 
canvassing the controversial terrain of white bloc voting as an obstacle to 
black electoral success. 
MEASURING PROGRESS IN BLACK OFFICEHOLDING 
That there has been some incremental change in the election of blacks to 
public office cannot be disputed. The Voting Rights Act brought an imme-
diate and extraordinacy change in the nation's political landscape. Besides 
bringing hundreds of thousands of blacks into the political process, fed-
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eral voting rights legislation facilitated the election of blacks to public 
office. In 1941, the total number of black officeholders nationwide was a 
mere 33, compared to 280 in 1965. Fewer than 100 blacks held office in 
the seven originally targeted Southern states at the time the legislation was 
enacted. 12 The magnitude of the growth in black officeholding is shown 
in Figure 4.1. Over a two-decade span, the number of blacks elected to 
public office rose over 500 percent from 1,469 in 1970 to 7,370 in 1990. 
Today, more than 8,000 blacks hold elected office at the federal, state, 
city, county, and municipal levels of government. ' 
The impact of the Voting Rights Act on black electoral success in the 
South was dramatic (Table 4.1). Indeed, Southern states contributed much 
to the numerical increase in black officeholding-4,544. With a net increase 
of 172 blacks, the state of Texas led the region, followed by Louisiana 
(57), South Carolina (37), Mississippi (35); and Georgia (32). Of the ten 
states with the largest number of black elected officials, eight are in the 
South: Mississippi (751), Alabama (699), Louisiana (636), Georgia (545), 
Texas ( 472), North Carolina ( 468), South Carolina ( 450), and Arkansas 
(380). 13 And yet the sizable increase in black officeholding in the South 
has not changed the status quo; on the whole, "the region's officeholders 
remain members of the majority racial group." 14 
In Arkansas, for example, blacks account for 11. 4 percent of the voting-
age population but comprise a mere 3.8 percent of all elected officials in 
the state. Similarly, a scant 2.5 percent of all elected officials in Tennessee 
are black. In Texas the percentage is 1.8, and in Virginia, 5.0 percent. 
Bernard Grofman and 'Lisa Handley, grappling with the underrepre-
sentation of black officeholders, have argued that "politics in the United 
States, especially in the South, is characterized by a high level of racially 
polarized voting. As a consequence, only areas with very substantial black 
population percentages are likely to elect blacks." 15 By no means is this 
an exaggeration. The number of blacks elected to Congress, for instance, 
increased from 26 to 39 in 1992 and to 41 in 1994. However, as is readily 
apparent from Table 4.2, were it not for predominantly black electoral 
districts,fewerblacks would have been: sent to Congress. This is especially 
true in the South. Prior to the 1990 reapportionment, there were a total of 
four black congresspersons from the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 
Following congressional reapportionment in 1991, blacks were elected 
from Florida for the first time ever and from Alabama, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, and Virginia for the first time in more than a century. All 
were sent to Congress from majority-black districts. Chandler Davidson 
After HIRerv·}Ollns-+ 
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The growth in total black elected officials in the 










































Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 
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7,480 
8,015 
puts the point more exactly: " ... blacks ... have had an extremely difficult 
time electing their candidates to office as a result of white bloc voting and 
dilutionary election laws .... " 16 
The remarkable upswing in black officeholding just discussed, then, 
must be attributed primarily to direct federal intervention-in the form of 
the Voting Rights Act-rather than to changing regional or nationatracial 
attitudes. Laughlin McDonald, summing up the prevailing view of voting-
rights experts, explains: "The increase in minority officeholding can be 
traced to the operation of the Voting Rights Act as a whole-to the abolition 
of discriminatory tests for voting, the expansion of minority registration, 
and the requirement of preclearance of new voting practices under 
Section 5. Equally critical, however, has been the adoption of effective 
minority voting districts, many as a result of litigation or the threat of 
litigation under Section 2." 17 
THE PERSISTENCE OF RACIAL BLOC VOTING AMONG WHITES 
Admittedly, a number of black officeholders have won elections in the last 
two decades with substantial support from white voters, sometimes even 
in majority-white jurisdictions. For instance, Tom Bradley of Los Angeles, 
Ernest Moria! of New Orleans, Harold Washington of Chicago, David Dinkins 
of New York, Norman Rice of Seattle, and Ron Kirk of Dallas were the first 
blacks ever to govern these metropolitan cities.18 Bradley was first elected 
in 1973 and served until June 1993. Moria! won the New Orleans mayor-
alty in 1977 with 19 percent of the white vote. Garnering no more than 
12 percent of the vote share among white Chicagoans, Washington still 
won the 1983 election; he was re-elected in 1987 but died a few weeks 
after being sworn in. In a city where Democrats outnumber Republicans 5 
to 1, Dinkins won the New York mayoralty by just two percentage points, 
capturing just 31 percent of the white vote in 1989. Elected as Dallas' first 
black mayor in 1995, Kirk gained a much larger portion of the white vote, 
42 percent. 
It should be emphasized that it is very difficult for black candidates to 
be elected outside majority-black jurisdictions despite these well-publicized 
cases. In 1989, Virginian Douglas Wilder became the first black elected 
governor from a southern state. Exit polls showed that he captured 39 
percent of the white vote. In 1992, Carol Moseley-Braun of Illinois became 
the first black woman ever to hold a seat in the United States Senate. 19 In · 
1996, Julia Carson was elected to Congress from a white-majority district 
in Indiana, along with three black lawmakers who were forced to run in 
redrawn majority-white jurisdictions. zo 
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Citing such well-publicized election breakthroughs, critics of race-
conscious districting have argued that the phenomenon of racial bloc voting 
among whites on account of racial animus has largely collapsed. For that 
reason, it is no longer necessary to draw legislative boundaries to enhance 
the election prospects of black office-seekers. Carol Swain, for instance, 
maintains: "Black Democrats Ronald Dellums, Alan Wheat, and Bill Clay 
and black Republicans Gary Franks and J.C. Watts have shown that white 
voters in congressional elections will support black candidates. Similarly, 
the elections of Illinois Senator Carol Moseley Braun, former Virginia 
Governor L. Douglas Wilder, Ohio Treasurer J. Kenneth Blackwell, and 
New York Comptroller Carl McCall show that race is no longer an 
insurmountable barrier to black electoral success at the state level as well." 21 
Richard Pildes reaches a sharply contrasting conclusion. He has ar-
gued, for example, that despite such political gains on the part of black 
Americans, whites remain less willing because of race to support black 
candidates for elected office, and any assertion that they are so inclined is 
"fanciful." 22 He admonishes that "general inferences drawn from a few 
easily recalled examples are notoriously hazardous guides to truth." 23 In 
other words, the anecdotal evidence of a few case studies is wholly inad-
equate to buttress the generalized conclusions being drawn. But, in fact, 
the literature contains example after example of black office-seekers who 
were unable to attract sizable electoral support from white voters due to 
consistent and widespread bloc voting patterns. For instance, Paul Kleppner 
concluded that race dominated voting choices in the 1983 Chicago may-
oral election between Harold Washington and Bernard Epton. 24 Mean-
while, a 1989 American Civil Liberties Union study of elections in Georgia 
found that where there was a "serious" black political candidate, 86 per-
cent of whites voted for the white opponent(s) of the black office-seeker. 25 
In a more recent investigation, Michael Binford marshaled evidence dem-
onstrating that very few white Georgians crossed-over to-cast a ballot for 
a black political candidate and that levels of bloc voting among whites 
were more pronounced in higher-profile contests. 26 
This, of course, raises the question: "Why do whites tend to vote 
along racial lines?" Richard Murray and Arnold Vedlitz along with Carol 
Swain, for instance, have suggested that voters support an office-seeker 
with whom they share skin color or ethnicity 27 and that this is expected-
if not rational-behavior. But I would also suggest that where the vote 
choice involves a black candidate, white voters do not simply react posi-
tively to the white candidate but negatively to the black one because 
whites still harbor antiblack opinions, attitudes, and characterizations. To 
,. Redistricting and nllnortty representation 
put the point more exactly, despite the positive and genuine changes in 
whites' racial attitudes during the past several decades, old-fashioned big-
otry and prejudice are not entirely dead. 28 Racial stereotyping among 
whites is as prevalent today as old-fashioned bigotry and prejudice ever 
was, according to recent research. 29 In one such study, respondents were 
given a card showing a seven-point scale with a positive characteristic, 
such as "intelligent," at one end and the opposite characteristic, such as 
"unintelligent," at the other. In addition, study participants were asked to 
rank their own race and the other race on the following criteria: 
• Rich versus poor; 
• Prefers to be self-supporting versus prefers to live off welfare; 
• Hard to get along with versus easy to get along with; 
• Tends to speak English well versus tends to speak English poorly. 30 
Figure 4.2 presents the scores white study respondents assigged to 
both whites and blacks as categorical groups. 31 Although some whites 
coi:islsteiitly ranked blacks at the same point on the four scales highlighted 
in Figure 4.2, what is clear is that whites generally believe blacks are less 
intelligent than whites, prefer more than whites to live off welfare, are 
more difficult to get along with, and speak English much more poorly 
than whites. Indeed, whites saw the largest gaps with regard to a preference 
for self-support and the ability to speak English, while they viewed the 
racial discrepancy as small with regard to getting along with blacks. Fifty-
six percent of· white respondents ranked whites ahead of blacks in 
intelligence, 71 percent ranked whites higher with regard to self-support 
while more than three-quarters reported that whites spoke English better 
than blacks. The central point to be made here then is this: whites tend to 
view blacks as inferior to their own group along several dimensions, and 
they are apf to evaluate black political candidates as such. 32 
Moreover, the tendency toward white bloc voting is further exacerbated 
by the use of racial campaign appeals by their white opponents. For 
example, in 1986 and again in 1988, Louisiana attorney Faye Williams 
attempted to become the first black candidate to win elected office from 
the eighth congressional district and the first black to represent the state in 
the U.S. Congress since Reconstruction. Williams, an Alexandria attorney, 
found herself in a hotly contested runoff with Republican Clyde Holloway, 
a white nurseryman and self-proclaimed "good old boy" who had led a 
1981 school busing protest. Contributing to her narrow defeat in 1986, 33 
undoubtedly, was a racially charged campaign permeated with both blatant 
After HIiier v Jolrnson ~ 
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How Detroit area whites rated blacks and whites with 
regard to four components of stereotype index, on a 
scale from I to 7 
INTELLIGENT SELF-SUPPORTING 
Mean= 4.9 I Mean= 4.0 
■ Blacks 2% ~ ?% 
II Whites .... 






EASYTO GET ALONG WITH 
0 
HARD TO GET ALONG WITH 
29% 
0 
PREFERS TO LIVE OFF WELFARE 
SPEAKS ENGLISH WELL 
() 
SPEAKS ENGLISH POORLY 
Source: Reynolds Farley, Maria Krysan,Tara Jackson, Charlotte Steeh, and Keith Reeves, "Causes of 
Continued Racial Residential Segregation: Stereotypes, Steering, and Residential Preferences," Ameri-
can Journal of Sociology 100, 1994. 
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and subtle appeals to racism, conveyed by both her opponent and the 
news media. 34 Indeed, despite the election of some black candidates from 
majority-white districts, for most minority candidates strong voting along 
racial lines remains the reality. 35 
PROVING RACIAL ANIMUS TOWARD BLACK OFFICE-SEEKERS 
Where it is found that blacks and whites vote differently, disputants of 
race-conscious districting understandably remain skeptical that racial bloc 
voting on the part of whites "keeps candidates preferred by blacks from 
gaining office." Besides, many are confounded by the thorny concept of 
"racially polarized voting"-how to measure it, how it works, and, perhaps 
most important, how to define it. Abigail Thernstrom, for instance, opines: 
"The question of racial polarization is central to any voting rights dispute, 
but there is no consensus on how to measure it. ... Black candidates, like 
white ones, lose elections for a variety of reasons, including insufficient 
support from black constituents, the power. of incumbency, inadequate 
name recognition, age, experience, reputation, and political orientation .... 
Disputes over the extent of racial bloc voting and the record of minority 
electoral successes disguise the real question: how much weight should 
one give to the fact that whites tend to vote for whites, blacks for 
blacks ... ?" 36 
Moreover, the secrecy of the ballot precludes us--much of the time-
from disentangling the myriad of factors that influence a voter's candidate 
selection. Indeed, attempting to discern whether whites' political choices 
in a biracial political contest are motivated by racial animus is daunting. 37 
Bernard Grofman has commented: 
It is as a matter of practical statistical analysis, essentially impossible 
to ... [distinguish ifl the voting patterns of whites ... [are] caused by 
the race of the voter or by partisanship, because partisanship and 
race are so inextricably intertwined. In order to do the statistical 
analysis ... you have to shift from bivariate to multivariate ... the 
problem with that is twofold. First of all, it's almost impossible to 
figure out what you've got when you've got it. It sort of messes 
everything up. It's just very, very complicated. And secondly, what 
will happen is these other things are more or less highly correlated 
with race. If for example, whites are more likely to get newspaper 
endorsements in small southern towns than black challengers ... then 
what's going to happen is that all these other explanatory factors are 
going to suggest that voting isn't polarized, even explanatorily 
polarized. What will happen is that the race of the voters will wash 
out. All these other things which turn out to be more or less 
After MIiier v Johnson t 
synonymous with or correlated with the race of the candidate will 
sort of explain away the patterns of voting.'' 38 
Indeed Grofman and his colleagues, Lisa Handley and Richard Niemi, 
have gone so far as to argue that proving discriminatory intent by whites 
is impossible. 39 
To be sure, demonstrating that whites engage in white bloc voting on 
account of racial animus has been a herculean task to date. For voters, any 
electoral choice is a concealed, perhaps even camouflaged activity. This is 
especially the case for whites when the choice includes a black candidate. 
One can enter the voting booth, make a selection, exit, and be greeted by 
a pollster inquiring about one's vote. To this inquiry, one can answer 
truthfully or otherwise. Given the privacy of the ballot, the political analyst 
is relegated to drawing inferences about individual judgments and political 
choices from aggregate voting returns--usually cross-registration and 
turnout figures. Using data of this sort to assess whether whites' political 
choices are affected by racial animus or anything else is beset with specific 
limitations, the most serious being that cross-registration and turnout data 
do not provide direct information about what motivates the selection of a 
candidate. Thus, it is difficult to discern the reasons for whites' political 
choices in a biracial contest. In fact, however, identifying and demonstrating 
racial animus among whites can be shown by the use of carefully controlled 
experimental methods. 40 
To ascertain whether whites' political choices are motivated by racial 
animus, I conducted a biracial campaign study experiment. First, a repre-
sentative cross-section of white individuals residing in Michigan were in-
terviewed as part of a probability, face-to-face public opinion survey. This 
initial study specifically sought to examine the links among racial atti-
tudes, racial residential segregation, and labor market inequalities. Indi-
viduals were queried about their identification with political parties and 
ideological predispositions. Standard demographic information, such as 
education, income, gender, and religious orientation, was collected as 
well. Given the primary focus of the study, only household members 21 
years of age and older were eligible. 
Approximately six months later, each of the white respondents 
interviewed in the face-to-face opinion survey was randomly assigned to 
receive a brief mail questionnaire containing one of two contrived news 
campaign stories. Each campaign story depicted an especially negative-
spirited, nonpartisan mayoral election contest between two fictitious 
candidates: Arthur Christopher, a well-respected businessman and former 
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head of the city's chamber of commerce, and Gregoi:y Hammond, a fifteen-
year veteran of the city council. The text of these "news articles" appears 
in Figure 4.3. 
The reader will observe that it refers to the fact that Christopher and 
Hammond hold contrasting policy stances regarding affirmative action 
policy; candidate Hammond is depicted as a prudent proponent of 
affirmative action. However, the text of the second news article is nearly 
identical, save for one important detail: candidate Hammond's race was 
changed. This particular campaign stoi:y reported that he is "seeking to 
become the city's first black mayor." Thus, in the two news campaign 
articles that described the mayoral candidates' stances on affirmative action 
policy, one stoi:y depicted a same-race contest in which both mayoral 
candidates are white, while the other news stoi:y described a biracial contest, 
in which one office-seeker is white and his opponent black. 
H@Hiii 
Text of campaign news stories used in experimental study 
(italicized text was changed in second version of story) 
CANDIDATES DISAGREE ON AFARMATIVEACTION 
by Thomas Young 
Staff Writer 
The nonpartisan mayoral race entered its final hours with the candidates, local 
businessman Arthur Christopher and long-time city councilman Gregory Hammond 
answering voters' questions during a well-attended town meeting last night. 
What began as a clash of visions and personalities, by evening's end, the candi-
dates' exchanges took on a more amiable tone as members of the audience pleaded with 
them to focus on issues and dispense with the negative attacks that marked the 
campaign thus far. 
Though a wide array of questions from education to the environment was posed 
to the candidates, a question regarding affirmative action elicited the sharpest disagree-
ment between Christopher and Hammond during the evening. 
David Carnes, an unemployed laborer, asked the candidates to explain their 
positions on affirmative action. Christopher, 47, who is white, said that he opposes 
affirmative action programs. "Quotas are not the answer. My opponent's support of 
affirmative action programs amounts to quotas, plain and simple." Hammond, 45, who is 
also white, retorted that Christopher continues to misrepresent his position. "I favor 
affirmative action programs as a remedy when there has been an identifiable history of 
discrimination by an employer:' Hammond said. 
Both Christopher and Hammond noted that they are well-suited to tackle the 
city's growing deficit. Christopher cited his long-time business experience and five-year 
involvement with the city's Chamber of Commerce which has helped bring jobs to the 
area. Hammond, on the other hand, said that his fifteen years on the council makes him 
the most qualified to address the city's increasingly complex problems. 
After HIiier V Johnson~ 
Finally, each of the print news campaign articles concluded by 
mentioning identical biographical information about the candidates' age, 
professional qualifications, and experience. Thus, the campaign stories 
given to white participants in the study differed only in one dimension: 
the mention of the candidates· race. As one can readily see, all other central 
campaign information did not vary. 41 
A research investigation of this kind is particularly significant for the 
following reasons. First, the study provides direct information about the 
motivations and sentiments underlying white voting behavior toward a 
black office-seeker. For instance, respondents were queried about their: 
(1) racial attitudes, (2) evaluation of the candidates, and (3) vote choices-
"if the election were held today." Second, the fact that many voting-rights 
disputes cover small jurisdictions or past events means that individual-
level survey instruments for these cases are usually not available and cannot 
be constructed. 42 This experimental campaign study enables us to peer 
inside the privacy of the ballot box. Third and most important, if it can be 
shown that whites' limited receptivity toward a black office-seeker is due 
to racial animus-independent of political orientation, qualifications, and 
experience, age, reputation, or some other personal attribute-is an 
affirmative remedy not warranted? Finally, because great care was taken to 
anticipate and avoid the weaknesses generally associated with experiments, 
the results can be generalized to the populations of interest here. 43 
Several striking conclusions emerge from this biracial election cam-
paign study. First, whites who read the affirmative action-biracial contest 
news story were reluctant to vote for the black Hammond candidate, de-
spite the fact that he possessed identical credentials, political experience, 
and personal characteri5tics as his white counterpart depicted in the other 
news story. Second, whites' aversion to casting a ballot for the black of-
fice-seeker is associated with the negative attitudes, opinions, stereotypes, 
and characterizations they harbor about blacks as a categorical group. The 
Hammond candidate was evaluated accordingly. Third, and perhaps most 
important, racial animus-and not ideological orientation-was the sig-
nificant determinant of white electoral support toward the black mayoral 
candidate in the study. Indeed, the voting discrimination against the black 
political candidate was found to be "discernible, specific, purposeful, con-
tempornry." Given the arresting empirical evidence-from which more 
reliable inferences about whites' voting behavior can be drawn--one must 
conclude that with few exceptions then, "barriers to the election of minor-
ity candidates from predominantly white jurisdictions have not collapsed." 44 
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CONCLUSION 
With all the enormous inroads made by black office-seekers since the 
passage of the 1965 Voting Rights Act-and it5 subsequent amendments--
racial bloc voting among whites is still a constant and pernicious barrier 
for many who must garner white electoral support. It stacks the electoral 
deck against black political candidates. What is more, white bloc voting 
on account of racial animus shows no signs of diminishing. Chandler 
Davidson has argued that "there is still a great deal of resistance to the 
election of black officials by whites in the country as a whole." 45 All signs 
of the post-Miller political reality point to an almost certain standstill, or 
worse-a diminution of the number of black officeholders at the 
congressional, state, and local levels. 46 Yet, in the face of strong evidence 
that continued and widespread white bloc voting based on racial animus 
in the main "keeps candidates preferred by blacks from gaining office," 
the Court has made redressing this injustice much more difficult with its 
recent foray into the "jurispmdential wilderness" of racial redistricting. 
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Notes 
I am indebted to David A. Bositis, Tara D. Jackson, Robert Richie, and 
anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this work. Moreover, 
I extend my appreciation to Mary Jane Rose for her assistance in preparing the 
tables and figures. 
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Tables , 
lhi·lllll 
Black elected officials in southern states as a percentage of 
all elected officials, January 1993 
BLACKS ASA 
PERCENTAGE OF ELECTED OFFICIALS 
VOTING-AGE PERCENT NET CHANGE 
STATE POPULATION TOTAL BLACK BLACK (1992-93) 
Alabama 22.7 4,315 699 16.2 -3 
Arkansas 13.7 8,331 380 4.6 38 
Florida 11.4 5,256 200 3.8 17 
Georgia 24.6 6,556 545 18.3 32 
Louisiana 27.9 4,966 636 12.8 57 
Mississippi 31.6 4,944 751 15.2 35 
North Carolina 20.1 5,531 468 8.5 10 
South Carolina 26.9 3,692 450 12.:Jt. 37 
Tennessee 14.4 6,841 168 2.5 
Texas 11.2 26,932 472 1.8 172 
Virginia 17.6 3,112 155 5.0 -I 
Source: Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies. 
+ Redistricting and minority representation 
lt+Nlltl 
Congressional districts in which blacks constituted a 
majority of the population, I 04th Congress 
DISTRICT PERCENT PERCENT 
STATE NUM5ER 5LACK WHITE REPRESENTATIVE 
Alabama 7 68 32 Earl F. Hilliard (D) 
Florida 3 55 43 Corrine Brown (D) 
Florida 17 58 37 Carrie Meek (D) 
Florida 23 52 45 Alcee L. Hastings (D) 
Georgia 2 57 42 Sanford Bishop.Jr. (D) 
Georgia 5 62 36 John Lewis (D) 
Georgia 11 64 34 Cynthia McKinney (D) 
Illinois 70 27 Bobby L. Rush (D) 
Illinois 2 68 27 Jesse Jackson.Jr. (D)a 
Illinois 7 66 29 Cardiss Collins (D) 
Louisiana 2 61 36 William J.Jefferson (D) 
Louisiana 4 58 41 Cleo Fields (D) 
Maryland 4 58 33 Albert R. Wynn (D) 
Maryland 7 71 27 Kweisi Mfume (D)b 
Michigan 14 69 29 John Conyers.Jr. (D) 
Michigan 15 70 26 B. Rose Collins (D) 
Mississippi 2 63 37 Bennie Thompson (D) 
Missouri 52 46 William L. Clay (D) 
New Jersey 10 60 33 Donald M. Payne (D) 
NewYork 6 56 29 Floyd H. Flake (D) 
NewYork 10 61 27 Edolphus Towns (D) 
NewYork 11 74 19 Major R. Owens (D) 
North Carolina I 57 42 Eva M. Clayton (D) 
North Carolina 12 57 42 Melvin Watt (D) 
Ohio 11 59 40 Louis Stokes (D) 
Pennsylvania I 52 38 Thomas Foglietta (D)c 
Pennsylvania 2 62 35 Chaka Fattah (D) 
South Carolina 6 62 37 James E. Clyburn (D) 
Tennessee 9 59 40 Harold E. Ford (D) 
Texas 18 51 38 Sheila Jackson-Lee (D) 
Texas 30 50 38 Eddie B.Johnson (D) 
Virginia 3 64 33 Robert C. Scott (D) 
a .Served the remaining term of Representative Mel Reynolds who resigned in 1995. 
b Retired from the House of Representatives in February 1996. 
c Foglietta is white. 
Source: Phillip D. Duncan, Christine C. Lawrence, and staff of Congressional Quarterly, Politics in America 
I 996: The I 04th Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, 1996 ). 
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